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Abstract

This study contributes simultaneously to research on women board members and competitive
dynamics by investigating two unresolved research questions: What is the effect of female directors on
the firm’s competitive repertoire? Under what conditions is this effect more pronounced? Leveraging
the “Awareness-Motivation-Capability” (AMC) framework, we predict that having women on the board
of directors should impact the complexity, heterogeneity, and volume of the firm’s competitive moves.
Relying upon a sample of U.S. pharmaceutical firms for the years 2000 to 2017, we find that adding

female directors on the board positively affects the complexity and volume of a firm’s competitive
moves, but negatively impacts the heterogeneity of competitive actions. In addition, the presence of a
female CEO moderates these effects, leading to more complex competitive actions and increased
volume. Thus, our study lends a greater understanding of how female board members influence
competitive dynamics and shape the strategic direction of the firm.
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Female board members accounted for 40% of new board appointees in S&P 500 firms during 2018 but
the overall percentage of female board members remains relatively low, reaching only 24% in 2018 of
total board seats (SpencerStuart, 2018). As a result, a myriad of constituencies—advocacy groups,
institutional investors, and governmental officials—have intensified their efforts to increase gender
diversity in the boardroom (Cook & Glass, 2014). Shareholder activists, such as large institutional
investors State Street Global Advisors, New York Pension Funds, and BlackRock, have made it a priority
to increase the number of women on corporate boards by filing shareholder resolutions, engaging in
letter writing campaigns, joining global campaigns, and exercising their voting rights against members
of underrepresented boards (Grosvold, 2011; Marquardt & Wiedman, 2016; Ross-Sorkin, 2018). There
is evidence that these strong actions are leading to more disclosure and transparency about board
members in terms of gender and ethnicity, and an increase in the number of female and minority
directors (de la Merced, 2018).
In addition to this growing societal pressure on corporations, an increasing number of practitioners and
scholars continue to investigate the business case for female representation on corporate boards
(Galbreath, 2018; Hoobler, Masterson, Nkomo, & Michel, 2016; Post & Byron, 2015). Strong arguments
have been made about the strategic benefits of having more female board members, who through
their unique experiences, knowledge, and backgrounds, may improve board decision making
(Geletkanycz, Clark, & Gabaldon, 2018). However, attempts to quantify these benefits by examining a
firm’s financial performance have produced mixed and inconclusive results, with some studies
reporting a positive relationship between female directors and firm financial performance (Campbell &
Minguez-Vera, 2010; Cook & Glass, 2014; Galbreath, 2018; Hoobler et al., 2016; Post & Byron, 2015),
other studies demonstrating a negative relationship (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren & Strøm, 2010;
Darmadi, 2011; Mínguez-Vera & Martin, 2011), and yet others showing no impact (Carter, D’Souza,
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Rose, 2007; Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997).
These conflicting results have prompted scholars to shift the focus from analyzing the direct
relationship between female directors and performance to identifying the specific actions through
which female board members affect firm outcomes (Andrevski, Richard, Shaw, & Ferrier, 2014;
Galbreath, 2018; Hoobler et al., 2016; Miller & Triana, 2009). In particular, Cook and Glass (2014) argue
that a better understanding is needed about the entire range of effects that female board members
may have on corporate policies and procedures.
We address this challenge by analyzing how female directors affect the competitive strategy and
behavior of firms. An increasing number of studies demonstrate the key role that boards play in
strategic decision making, in strategy initiation (Haunschild, 1993), and in strategy development (Cook

& Glass, 2014; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Johnson, Daily, &
Ellstrand, 1996; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013). However, there has been little focus on how
corporate boards, and more specifically female board members, shape a firm’s “competitive
repertoire” which encompasses the pattern of competitive actions carried out in a given time period
(Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999). Analyzing competitive actions provides an opportunity to examine
how female board members influence the observable and longitudinal strategic actions that firms
undertake (Chen & Miller, 2012).
Our study makes three research contributions. First, we integrate two research streams—female board
representation and competitive dynamics (CD)—to address how female directors influence the firm’s
pattern of competitive actions. We extend recent research on the strategic implications of women in
the boardroom (Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016; Triana et al., 2013) by analyzing how female board
representation affects three critical dimensions of the firm’s competitive repertoire: competitive
complexity (the range of actions the firm engages in), competitive heterogeneity (the difference in
actions compared with industry competitors), and competitive volume (the number of actions;
Andrevski et al., 2014; M. J. Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al.,
1999; Hughes-Morgan & Ferrier, 2014; Miller & Chen, 1996a, 1996b). Focusing on these dimensions of
the competitive repertoire, we shed more light on the general debate whether female directors
facilitate strategic actions by generating more ideas, viewpoints, and a more thorough analysis of
strategic alternatives (Miller & Triana, 2009) or hinder strategic decision-making processes by
generating interpersonal conflict and reducing board cooperation (Chen et al., 2016; Triana et al.,
2013).
Second, we contribute to CD research by identifying underexplored drivers of competitive actions.
Although past research has examined various firm and managerial antecedents of competitive actions,
it has overlooked the role of board gender composition on these actions. Thus, our study responds to
calls for investigation of how gender within the board of directors influences the competitive
repertoire of firms (Hughes-Morgan, Kolev, & McNamara, 2018). Employing the “AwarenessMotivation-Capability (AMC)” model that has been widely used in CD analysis (Chen et al., 2007;
Hughes-Morgan et al., 2018; Uhlenbruck, Hughes-Morgan, Hitt, Ferrier, & Brymer, 2017), we examine
how female board members influence (a) the board’s awareness of competitive actions, (b) the board’s
motivation to engage in competitive actions, and (c) the board’s capability to drive competitive actions.
The AMC model has been a linchpin for understanding how the perceptions, opinions, and capabilities
of corporate leaders shape competitive patterns of actions (Chen & Miller, 2012). The model has been
useful for differentiating and predicting why two firms facing exactly the same market conditions may
evaluate those conditions and compete very differently (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007). Although
previous scholars have applied the AMC framework to understanding the general characteristics of
firms and their competitive posture, we expand its application to board-level characteristics.
A final contribution of our study is to shed more light on the importance of context when exploring the
role of female directors. Specifically, we focus on how the presence of a female CEO moderates the
relationship between female board representation and competitive actions. Female CEOs have been
found to possess specific traits, “courage, risk taking, resilience, and the ability to manage ambiguity,”
that contribute to their success in facing market and competitive demands (Stevenson & Orr, 2017).

Recent empirical evidence confirms that firms with female CEOs may improve firm decision-making
processes due to superior leadership qualities stemming from better communication and listening
skills (Peni, 2014). In addition, having female CEOs is associated with an increase in the number of
female directors and may also lead to a more supportive environment in which female board members
are encouraged to apply their skills and resources (Bernardi, Bosco, & Vassill, 2006; Hoobler et al.,
2016). Consistent with those arguments, we posit that a female CEO will enhance the ability of female
directors to contribute to the development of various patterns of competitive actions.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Employing the AMC Framework

The AMC model has been the prevalent framework for enriching understanding about CD in general as
well as the three widely used dimensions of competitive actions—complexity, heterogeneity, and
volume (Chen & Miller, 1994, 2012; Chen et al., 2007; Hughes-Morgan et al., 2018; Uhlenbruck et al.,
2017). Given calls to analyze how micro factors, especially corporate governance characteristics, drive
competitive actions (Chen & Miller, 2012), we view the AMC model as an appropriate theoretical
framework for examining how female board members affect the competitive repertoire of the firm.
Moreover, the AMC model provides a broad theoretical hook for linking the conceptual arguments on
the role and function of female directors (see, for review, Hoobler et al., 2016; Post & Byron, 2015)
with their potential to shape CD.
The awareness component of the AMC framework allows us to theorize whether female board
members are more cognizant of the firm’s surrounding industry and the characteristics of the external
environment (Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001) than their
male counterparts. Prior research drawing from resource dependency theory and upper echelon
theory has extensively linked female directors with enhanced awareness about possible strategic
options (Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002; Hillman et al., 2007; Post & Byron, 2015). For example,
Parola, Ellis, and Golden (2015) examine how female executives facilitate the identification and
selection of potential target firms during the pre-acquisition stage. If female directors possess different
cognitive frames, education, skills, experiences, and social ties, then their inclusion on corporate
boards may facilitate the identification of additional/disparate potential threats and opportunities
facing the firm (Hillman et al., 2002, 2007; Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 2011). As a result, a greater
number of women in the boardroom should enhance the overall board’s awareness about possible
competitive actions.
The second component of the framework, motivation, generally refers to the willingness to pursue
various activities based on their perceived gains and losses (Haleblian et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2001).
Thus, we examine whether female board members affect the board’s willingness to engage in various
competitive actions. Research based on agency theory finds that female directors are more diligent
monitors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and, as a result, may be more likely to avoid decisions that create
legal, ethical, and/or reputational risks (Cumming, Leung, & Rui, 2015; Post & Byron, 2015). Prior
research also suggests that women are more risk averse than men, which may lead to greater
willingness to avoid decisions that are inherently more uncertain (Cumming et al., 2015; Jeong &
Harrison, 2017). Another factor impacting the board’s motivation to pursue more uncertain outcomes

is associated with the consensus of the board when it faces challenging decisions. Research utilizing
social identity theory suggests that adding female directors could generate interpersonal conflict in the
boardroom and hinder directors’ willingness to collaborate (Chen et al., 2016), decreasing the overall
motivation of the board to take strategic actions.
The last component, capability, focuses on the ability to make strategic decisions, deploy resources,
and take actions (Haleblian et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2001). In the context of corporate boards, this
component of the AMC suggests that female board members may affect the decision-making
processes in the boardroom. On one hand, previous research suggests that the unique education,
experiences, and skills of female board directors could facilitate the sharing and discussion of diverse
ideas and alternatives (Hillman et al., 2002; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), which may enhance the board’s
problem-identifying and problem-solving capabilities. For example, female board members may use
their unique networks to access external resources and help in developing strategies for the firm
(Andrevski et al., 2014). On the other hand, scholars provide evidence that female directors’ different
experiences and perspectives could hinder the board’s ability to reach consensus and agree on a
common course of action. This results in the implementation of fewer strategic actions (Chen et al.,
2016).
In summary, using the AMC model makes it possible to discuss the effects that female board members
may have on competitive actions. Female board members with different career trajectories, functional
backgrounds, more education, and an exposure to a broader range of stakeholders than their male
counterparts should provide the board with greater awareness about competitive opportunities (Cook
& Glass, 2014). In terms of motivation, we expect that adding women to the board may lead to more
diligent monitoring and more risk aversion reducing the board’s willingness to pursue various
competitive actions (Chen et al., 2016). Finally, previous research indicates that female directors could
have a mixed effect on the capability of the board to implement competitive actions—although they
could enhance the board’s problem-solving capabilities (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996) and facilitate a
collaborative effort toward the implementation of a common course of action (Post & Byron, 2015),
women may generate more interpersonal conflict (Chen et al., 2016; Triana et al., 2013) and encumber
the board’s ability to implement firm strategies (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992).

Strategy as Action—CD

Based on the notion within Austrian economics that views competition as a process in which firms
continually strive to outcompete each other (Jacobson, 1992; Kirzner, 1973), the competitive dynamic
framework has garnered widespread attention not only in the field of strategic management, but also
in entrepreneurship, marketing, sociology, and interorganizational networks (Hutzschenreuter &
Horstkotte, 2013; Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004; Smith et al., 2001). At its core, CD views a firm’s
strategy as observed competitive action (Grimm, Lee, & Smith, 2006; Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992)
and scholars in this area explore how individual competitive actions stimulate competitive responses
(Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992), and how characteristics of the firm’s entire
repertoire of competitive actions influence firm performance (Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller & Chen,
1996a, 1996b).
A central idea in CD research relates to the conceptualization and measurement of the aggressiveness
with which a firm carries this repertoire of competitive actions or responses. CD scholars have

traditionally examined three key dimensions of the firm’s competitive repertoire: competitive
complexity, heterogeneity, and volume. These dimensions differ with respect to the cost and risk
involved with their implementation. First, competitive complexity encompasses a broad range of
competitive actions, such as price cuts, product improvements, advertising campaigns, new products
introductions, and acquisitions (Chang & Park, 2012; Connelly, Tihanyi, Ketchen, Carnes, & Ferrier,
2016; Ferrier, 2001; Hughes-Morgan & Ferrier, 2014; Uhlenbruck et al., 2017; Young, Smith, & Grimm,
1996). As these complex competitive actions require the mobilization of sizable resources and
cognitive efforts, they are inherently more costly and carry greater levels of risk than patterns of
competitive actions that are narrowly focused and more simple in nature (Miller & Chen, 1994).
Second, competitive heterogeneity relates to actions that differ from the actions of industry
competitors (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006; Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller & Chen,
1996a). As these actions are unproven in the industry and associated with uncertain performance
outcomes, heterogeneous actions carry greater levels of risk than patterns of competitive actions that
are proven in the industry (Miller & Chen, 1996b). Third, competitive volume reflects the number of
actions carried out and is generally considered not only the least risky dimension of a firm’s
competitive repertoire, but also the easiest for competitors to replicate (Hughes-Morgan, Ferrier, &
Labianca, 2010).
Recently, research has begun to explore the governance and cognitive drivers of competitive action.
For example, Connelly et al. (2016) examine how ownership structure and executive compensation
drive competitive complexity and Andrevski et al. (2014) study how top management team racial
diversity affects competitive intensity. Livengood and Reger (2010) develop the concept of an “identity
domain”—defined as the areas of the competitive market that are psychologically important to
managers—to explain why firms might compete more aggressively than usual. Marcel, Barr, and
Duhaime (2011) explore how different managerial cognitive schemes influence the likelihood and
speed with which a firm carries out retaliatory actions against rivals. Following this line of research, we
examine how female directors, by affecting the awareness, motivation, and capability of the entire
board, influence the complexity, heterogeneity, and volume of the firm’s competitive repertoire.

Hypotheses
Female Directors and Competitive Complexity

Drawing on prior research, we believe that a greater number of female directors will enhance the
awareness of the board and facilitate the execution of more complex competitive actions. The addition
of women to a traditionally male-dominated boardroom should position the board to more fully
understand the firm’s surrounding environment and various stakeholders (Post & Byron, 2015). Due to
the potentially different professional, nonprofessional, educational experiences and cognitive frames
that female board members bring to the boardroom, female board members may increase the board’s
awareness about pending strategic issues and challenges (Peterson & Nemeth, 1996; Post & Byron,
2015). In addition, female directors may be linked to different networks of managers and firms, and
this could enhance the board’s understanding of the complexities and heterogeneity in a firm’s
external environment (Hillman et al., 2002, 2007). Combining the different interlocked networks of
female directors with those of male directors may enable a corporate board to have a more
comprehensive and diverse perspective about potential threats and opportunities facing the firm

(Cook & Glass, 2014). In contrast, if the board consists only of men, it is likely to have a more limited
view on the firm’s environment and be much less aware of the various external cues surrounding the
firm.
In terms of motivation, we expect that corporate boards with more female directors will weaken the
overall board’s motivation to undertake complex competitive actions. Such actions are associated with
greater uncertainty and risk because they are more difficult to execute and have a relatively higher
probability of failure than pursuing a simpler competitive repertoire (Connelly et al., 2016; Ferrier et
al., 1999; Hughes-Morgan & Ferrier, 2014). For a firm to engage in more complex actions, consensus is
needed among the directors to pursue such actions. However, prior research provides evidence that
women compared with men are generally less open to and willing to engage in risky strategies (Adams
& Ferreira, 2009; Barber & Odean, 2001; Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Powell & Ansic, 1997; Sunden
& Surette, 1998). As a result, the overall motivation of the board to pursue these types of competitive
actions is likely to decrease.
Finally, we posit that female directors may have a positive or negative effect on capability. On one
hand, female directors may add unique experiences, different viewpoints, and diverse cognitive frames
to the boardroom resulting in decreased groupthink. This could stimulate the sharing and discussion of
a greater number of and more complex alternatives, enhance the board’s problem-solving skills
(Hambrick et al., 1996), and lead to the identification and eventual implementation of more complex
competitive repertoires. In addition, women have been found to be more cooperative (Bart &
McQueen, 2013; Post & Byron, 2015), which facilitates agreement on pursuing more complex
competitive actions. On the other hand, questions remain about whether female board directors will
be able to exercise their voice in the boardroom and facilitate extensive discussions about diverse
ideas and alternatives (Hoobler et al., 2016). Several researchers (Hoobler et al., 2016; Joecks, Pull, &
Vetter, 2013; Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011) have raised the issue of female board members being a
token, which restricts their capability to contribute to board decision-making processes. Previous
research has also suggested that more heterogeneous boards may lead to more conflict and slow the
approval process concerning complex competitive actions (Chen et al., 2016; Triana et al., 2013). If
these conditions persist, female directors may limit rather than enhance the capability of the board to
engage in more complex competitive actions.
The above arguments indicate that female board members’ effect on the awareness, motivation, and
capability of the board to pursue complex competitive actions may follow two different paths. If
female board members have a positive impact on awareness and capability, this may outweigh the
weakened motivation of the board and lead to a positive association with competitive complexity.
Conversely, if female board members exhibit a negative effect on motivation and capability, this may
outweigh the enhanced awareness of the board and lead to a negative association with competitive
complexity. As we are not aware of prior theorizing on whether a board’s awareness or motivation, or
capability has greater impact on its decisions, we could not make definite predictions on the sign of the
relationship between female directors and competitive complexity. Subsequently, we present
competing hypotheses regarding the role of female directors on competitive complexity.
•

Hypothesis 1a: Female board representation is positively associated with competitive
complexity.

•

Hypothesis 1b: Female board representation is negatively associated with competitive
complexity.

Female Directors and Competitive Heterogeneity

The theorizing on how female board members could affect the heterogeneity of competitive actions
should parallel the arguments underlying the influence of female directors on the complexity of
competitive patterns. In terms of awareness, the unique experiences, knowledge, and expertise of
female board members (Hillman et al., 2002, 2007) may facilitate the identification of competitive
actions that diverge from rival firms. Moreover, the possible exposure of female board members to a
broader range of stakeholders should help a corporate board identify various alternatives to compete
differently than their rivals (Post & Byron, 2015). As heterogeneous actions are the riskiest types of
competitive activities due to their divergence from established industry norms (Crossland, Zyung,
Hiller, & Hambrick, 2014; Haynes & Hillman, 2010), we expect female and male directors to differ in
their motivation to undertake these actions. Given the likelihood that female board members may be
more hesitant to undertake risky actions (Barber & Odean, 2001; Byrnes et al., 1999; Jeong & Harrison,
2017), it less likely that female board members will encourage the board to pursue this type of
competitive activity. Finally, with respect to capability, female board members may either enhance or
hinder the board’s capabilities to pursue heterogeneous actions. Female directors may contribute to
discussions of diverse competitive actions and encourage more cooperation and collaboration (Bart &
McQueen, 2013) to pursue these actions. However, their minority status in the boardroom could limit
their voice and participation in discussions and ultimately reduce the board’s capability to thoroughly
examine and pursue heterogeneous actions. Thus, we present competing hypotheses analogous to
those concerning competitive complexity.
•

Hypothesis 2a: Female board representation is positively associated with competitive
heterogeneity.

•

Hypothesis 2b: Female board representation is negatively associated with competitive
heterogeneity.

Female Directors and Competitive Volume

We posit that more women in the boardroom may enhance the awareness of the board through
increased knowledge and cognitive frames (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hillman et al., 2007; Post &
Byron, 2015) resulting in a more comprehensive assessment and an increased responsiveness to a
firm’s external environment (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Jackson & Joshi, 2004). For example,
Hillman et al. (2002) emphasize that a key benefit of adding women to the boardroom is an improved
understanding of customers and various constituents of the firm. Post and Byron (2015) also note that
women board members may have diverse experiences due to their knowledge about marketing and
sales. These arguments suggest that female directors could enhance the board’s awareness of the
demands of the external environment and the necessity for executing a large volume of strategic
actions, especially when the competitive environment requires more proactive undertakings.
Based on existing research, we surmise that female directors will encumber the board’s overall
motivation for implementing a large volume of actions. Female board members have been found to
exercise their monitoring role more diligently than male board members (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) by

analyzing board decisions more thoroughly and comprehensively (Cumming et al., 2015; Miller &
Triana, 2009; Post & Byron, 2015). Although this thoroughness may lead to better board decisions, it is
likely to reduce the speed of board decision making and the overall volume of competitive actions.
Prior research also finds that differences among group members, including gender, could undermine
the willingness to interact (Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998; Chattopadhyay, George, &
Lawrence, 2004; Hogg & Terry, 2000) and communicate (Smith et al., 1994). In particular, male
directors (female directors) may exhibit bias toward female members (male members) and be hesitant
to interact with them (Hogg, 2006; Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Pelled, 1996). This type of conflict leads to
less cohesiveness and desire for cooperation among board members (Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey,
2002; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Ultimately, a board consisting of male and female members could
exhibit lower motivation to agree on and pursue a larger volume of competitive actions (Baugh &
Graen, 1997).
Finally, we propose that the effect of female directors on the board’s capability to carry out a greater
volume of competitive actions is mixed. The addition of women to the board could undermine its
behavioral integration (Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2005) and hinder its ability to implement firm
strategies (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Stated differently, the presence of women in the boardroom
might put strains on the capability of the whole board to execute more competitive actions.
Conversely, prior research provides evidence that more diverse groups could encourage rather than
undermine volume of actions. Hambrick and colleagues (1996) emphasize that a diverse group “has
access to such wide-ranging stimuli and a broad potential repertoire that its ability to conceive and
launch actions on many fronts should outweigh the dampening effects of internal strains” (p. 655). In
addition, compared with men, women have been found to value interdependence and be less focused
on power (Adams & Funk, 2012), allowing them to stimulate collaboration (Post & Byron, 2015). If this
type of cooperative board culture emerges, then the presence of female directors may facilitate the
execution of a greater volume of competitive actions. As a result, we propose the following competing
hypotheses.
•

Hypothesis 3a: Female board representation is positively associated with competitive volume.

•

Hypothesis 3b: Female board representation is negatively associated with competitive volume.

The Moderating Role of CEO Gender

While the board of directors plays a key role in a firm’s strategy, the board does not exist in a vacuum
and regularly cooperates with the CEO in driving the firm’s competitive repertoire. Furthermore, a CEO
plays an important role in shaping the board’s decision-making processes and collaborative decisions
(Brown, Buchholtz, Butts, & Ward, 2016) and an important driver of these board interactions is the
gender of the CEO (Oliver, Krause, Busenbark, & Kalm, 2018). Consequently, we hypothesize that a
female CEO will moderate the relationship between female directors and the implementation of
competitive actions by affecting the awareness, motivation, and capability of the board. In terms of
awareness, female CEOs are likely to have experienced a much tougher and challenging career path to
become the firm’s leader than male CEOs (Hillman et al., 2002; Stern & Westphal, 2010). Through this
process, female CEOs may gain valuable experiences and business acumen to identify the necessary
responses to competitive challenges. Such strong alertness to external cues should complement the
enriched awareness of the surrounding environment provided by female directors; as a result, the

combination of a female CEO and female directors could lead to stronger awareness of what
competitive actions are necessary for the firm.
A female CEO is also expected to facilitate the motivation of the board to pursue competitive actions. A
female CEO is likely to encourage a more supportive board culture where female directors are more
easily accepted and where male and female directors are encouraged to collaborate in the boardroom
(Nielsen & Huse, 2010). A board operating in this type of organizational climate should be less
confrontational and exhibit more cohesiveness (Chatman et al., 1998). Ultimately, this could increase
the motivation of the entire board to work collectively resulting in a greater volume, variety, and
heterogeneity of competitive repertoires.
Finally, in her role at the top of the firm, a female CEO has likely been involved in complex and
heterogeneous patterns of action and has gained enough knowledge of how to execute them. Previous
academic research (Conyon, He, & Zhou, 2015; Eagly & Carli, 2003; Frye & Pham, 2018; Krishnan &
Park, 2005) suggests that women possess more effective leadership styles and have better
management skills. In addition, Nielsen and Huse (2010) contend that women leaders are better at
strategic control tasks, which include managerial decisions regarding firm strategy as well as
organization practices and policies (Frye & Pham, 2018). Consequently, female CEOs should be able to
share their valuable expertise and insights about formulating strategy and encourage all of the board’s
directors, including female directors, to pursue a range of competitive actions. According to the
homophily perspective (Glass & Cook, 2018), women’s ability to take actions depends on the presence
of other women in the organization. Having a female CEO could create a more trusting and supportive
environment, which may enhance the capability of female board directors to pursue competitive
actions. As a result, female directors (and ultimately the whole board) may be better positioned and
more capable of handling greater volume and greater diversity of competitive actions.
•

Hypothesis 4: CEO gender will moderate the relationship between female board representation
and competitive complexity, such that the relationship will be more positive or be less negative
with a female CEO.

•

Hypothesis 5: CEO gender will moderate the relationship between female board representation
and competitive heterogeneity, such that the relationship will be more positive or be less
negative with a female CEO.

•

Hypothesis 6: CEO gender will moderate the relationship between female board representation
and competitive volume, such that the relationship will be more positive or be less negative
with a female CEO.

Method
Sample

Our sample consists of an original hand-collected data set of publicly traded firms in the
pharmaceutical industry from 2000 to 2017. This industry provides an ideal context for studying how
female directors influence competitive actions directed at improving a company’s position vis-à-vis
other industry players (Uhlenbruck et al., 2017). First, there is substantial information available about
the types of competitive actions that pharmaceutical companies undertake. Second, as development

processes are lengthy and market appraisals of pharmaceutical firms depend in large part upon
estimates of eventual cash flows, companies widely announce competitive moves that are intended to
boost future valuations (Cardinal, 2001). Third, the relatively higher level of female representation in
the pharmaceutical industry serves to enhance the variability in our sample (Catalyst, 2015).1 Data on
firm characteristics came from Compustat, corporate board information was obtained from ISS
(formerly RiskMetrics), and CEO characteristics were accessed through Execucomp. The final sample
for testing the proposed hypotheses consists of an unbalanced panel of 358 firm-year observations (34
firms with about 11 annual observations per firm).

Measures
Dependent variables
Research in CD defines competitive actions as observable, specific, and externally directed moves
aimed at outsmarting rivals to gain a superior competitive position (D’Aveni, 1994; Ferrier, 2001; Smith
et al., 2001). Consistent with previous studies, we use structured content analysis (Jauch, Osborn, &
Martin, 1980) to gather and categorize published reports about firms’ competitive actions. We
searched Factiva, the Dow Jones–sponsored database of published news articles. Specifically, we
identified articles announcing competitive actions by searching keywords chosen to discover various
types of competitive actions. We modified the action type categories found in earlier research (Ferrier,
2001; Ferrier et al., 1999) to fit the competitive dimensions and characteristics of the pharmaceutical
industry. Consequently, we selected these action categories: capacity, clinical trials, legal, licensing
actions, marketing, new product introduction, overt signals, price, product improvement actions, and
promotional activities. These 10 action categories serve as the building blocks for creating a
pharmaceutical firm’s competitive repertoire for each year of our sample period. Table 1 provides
action categories, search keywords, and specific firm examples.
Table 1. Action Categories, Coding Keywords, and Example Headlines.
Action category
Pricing actions
Marketing
actions
Product actions
Capacity
actions
Legal actions
Signaling
actions

Content analysis
coding scheme
Keywords: price, cut,
discount, change
Keywords: advertise,
commercial, television,
campaign, spot
Keywords: introduce,
launch, unveil, roll out,
approve
Keywords: raises, boosts,
increase, expand
Keywords: sue, litigate,
settle, infringement
Keywords: vows, promises,
says, seeks, aims

Examples of headlines
“Abbott Laboratories has lowered prices on about
50 of its drugs (mostly injectable anesthetics
and intravenous products).”
“Interneuron Pharmaceuticals announces alliance
with American Cyanamid to market anti-obesity
product”
“Merck introduces Mevacor, to reduce serum
cholesterol”
“Alpharma Reaches Agreement to Expand
Vancomycin Capacity”
“Allergan Sues Santen Pharmaceutical, Alleges
Rights Infringement”
“Elan restructuring aims to please market.”

Improvement
actions
Promotion
actions
Clinical trial
actions

Keywords: improve,
enhance, update, change
Keywords: donate, contest,
sponsor, promote
Keywords: phase, clinical,
trial

“Systematic Tooling Analysis Improves WarnerLambert Product Transfer”
“Eli Lilly To Donate Drugs To Battle Tuberculosis
Crisis In Russia”
“Bristol-Myers, Liposome Begin Phase II Testing Of
ABLC Drug”

Note. Using Perreault and Leigh’s (1989) index of reliability, an index of 89% was attained for these action types.

To ensure coding reliability, two strategic management scholars independently categorized a randomly
selected sample (N = 300) of news article headlines into the 10 categories, and then compared their
respective coding. This approach produced a reliability index of .89, exceeding the conventionally
acceptable level of .70 (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).
Competitive complexity
To gauge the degree to which a company’s competitive repertoire includes a wide range of different
competitive action types, we used a Herfindahl-type index that accounts for the weighted variety
among 10 competitive action types (i.e., the number of competitive action categories used in a year
and the extent of action concentration within each category). For example, if one competitive action
category, say, product improvements, dominates the annual repertoire, it is deemed a simple
repertoire. Alternatively, if an annual repertoire comprises various competitive actions in a balanced
mix, that repertoire is more complex. Competitive complexity was computed as follows:
𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 2
�
𝑎𝑎 NT𝐿𝐿
where 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 ⁄NT𝐿𝐿 is the proportion of competitive actions in the ath action category carried out in a given
year.
Complexity = 1 − � �

Therefore, a company with a low complexity score used only a few competitive action types, while a
company with a high complexity score implemented a wide range of competitive action types.

Competitive heterogeneity
To assess the differences among firms’ competitive action repertoires, we compared Euclidean
distance scores (Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller & Chen, 1996b). We first computed the annual frequency
for each of the types of competitive actions carried out by each firm in a given year. We next calculated
the Euclidean distance between each firm’s repertoire of competitive actions in the year relative to the
industry average:
𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 2
Heterogeneity = � � − �
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇
𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇
where 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 = industry average of the frequency of competitive actions in the ath category,
𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 = industry total competitive actions,
𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 = frequency of firm’s competitive actions in the ath category, and
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 = firm total competitive actions.

A low score suggests that the firm executes a mix of competitive actions very similar to those of other
companies within the industry. A high score indicates that the firm executes competitive actions
different from those of rivals.
Competitive volume
To measure the extent to which a firm’s competitive repertoire consists of a greater or smaller total
number of competitive actions (irrespective of the types of actions), we tallied the number of
competitive actions carried out each year. This measure is consistent with prior research analyzing
volume of competitive actions (Ferrier et al., 1999; Young et al., 1996). The dependent variables were
measured in period t, while all independent and control variables were measured in period t – 1.

Independent Variables

Following previous research, we measure female board representation as the number of female board
members divided by total board size (Abdullah, Ismail, & Nachum, 2014; Chen et al., 2016). About 78%
of the firms in our sample had at least one female board member: 37% of the firms had one female
director, 28% had two female directors, and 13% had three or four female members.
CEO gender
Following previous research, we used a dummy variable where 1 represents a female CEO and 0
indicates a male CEO (Lee & James, 2007).2
Controls
We incorporated an extensive number of control variables that have been shown to affect a firm’s
competitive actions. As larger firms are more likely to undertake greater number and variety of
competitive actions, we controlled for firm size using the log of total assets (Audia & Greve, 2006). To
measure prior performance, which may impact the ability to undertake new actions, we used return on
assets (Andrevski et al., 2014). We accounted for the investment patterns of the firm that could affect
its ability to carry out competitive actions by including capital intensity (capital expenses divided by
sales; Crossland et al., 2014) and R&D intensity (research and development expenses divided by sales;
Greve, 2003). As excess resources could encourage more competitive actions, we also controlled for
slack (selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by sales; Iyer & Miller, 2008). As longer
tenure has been linked to maintaining the status quo in the firm (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, &
Fredrickson, 1993), we included CEO tenure measured as the number of years the CEO has occupied
the position. At the board level, we controlled for variables that may affect directors’ decision-making
processes. In particular, we accounted for board size (Chen et al., 2016), duality (dummy variable
where 1 indicates the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise; Boyd, 1995), board
independence (ratio of directors who are classified as neither “inside” nor “related outside” to total
board members; Chen et al., 2016; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Triana et al., 2013), and
board racial diversity (measured through the Blau index where directors belong to four categories:
Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White; Miller & Triana, 2009). Finally, we included year dummy variables
due to the fluctuating economic conditions during our sample period.
We estimated the variance inflation factors and none of them exceeded the conventional threshold of
10 (the mean value being 2.7), which further reduces concerns over multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen,
West, & Aiken, 2003). We handled extreme outliers in the data through winsorizing—R&D intensity

and slack were winsorized at the 99th percentile (Haleblian et al., 2012; Kolev, Wiseman, & GomezMejia, 2014). In a robustness check, we obtained the same results without winsorizing.

Analysis and Results

As we have a data set where a firm engages in multiple competitive actions over time, it is important
to account for the lack of independence among observations within a firm (Bliese, 2000).
Consequently, we relied on generalized estimation equations (GEEs) with robust standard errors
(Crossland et al., 2014; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). The advantage of GEEs is that they offer maximum
likelihood estimates, control for unobserved differences between firms, and account for
nonindependence of multiple observations per firm (Hanley, Negassa, Edwardes, & Forrester, 2003).
With GEE models, it is necessary to specify a distribution family, link function, and correlation structure
for each regression. Competitive volume is a limited-count variable, so we used a negative binomial
distribution, negative binomial link function, and independent correlation structure. Competitive
complexity is a variable that takes nonnegative values, so we used a Poisson distribution, log link
function, and independent correlation structure. Competitive heterogeneity also takes on nonnegative
values and we relied on Poisson distribution, log link function, and exchangeable correlation structure.
To choose the appropriate correlation structures, we applied the quasi-likelihood under the
independence model criterion prescribed by Cui and Qian (2007).
While we are interested in the effect of female board representation on various competitive actions,
female directors might not be appointed randomly to the board (Hillman et al., 2007). This creates a
potential endogeneity problem, which we addressed with a Heckman two-stage model. In the first
stage, we used a probit regression model to predict the probability of having a woman on the board.
The dependent variable—female dummy—is a binary variable, measured as one when there was at
least one female director and zero otherwise. This variable (measured in period t – 1) was regressed on
several variables: firm size, prior performance, capital intensity, absorbed slack, CEO gender, board
racial diversity, industry female directors (all those variables were measured in period t – 2), and year
dummies. From that regression, we calculated an inverse Mills ratio that was used as a control variable
in the regressions testing our hypotheses. Heckman two-stage models require the inclusion of at least
one independent variable in the first-stage regression, which is not entered in the second-stage
regressions (Sartori, 2003). In addition, this variable must be a valid exclusion restriction—it should be
significantly correlated with the dependent variable in the first-stage regression (female dummy) but
not correlated with the competitive action variables in the second-stage regression. In our case,
industry female directors served as this variable. The inverse Mills ratio was not significantly related to
our three dependent variables indicating that there were no serious endogeneity concerns. As its
inclusion in the main regression models did not change our results, we decided to exclude it from the
table for brevity.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the variables in our models. Table
3 presents the GEE regression results for testing the proposed hypotheses.

Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (N = 358).
Variables
M
SD
1
2
3
4
1. Complexity
0.44 0.33 1.00
2. Heterogeneity
0.26 0.32 −.89 1.00
3. Volume
4.02 3.04 .80 −.66 1.00
4. Firm size
7.85 1.88 .50 −.47 .56 1.00
5. Prior performance
0.07 0.12 .06 −.05 .09 .38
6. Capital intensity
0.05 0.05 .16 −.14 .07 −.10
7. R&D intensity
0.16 0.28 .03 .01 −.00 −.23
8. Slack
0.43 0.38 .02 .01 .01 −.28
9. CEO gender
0.02 0.15 .02 −.01 −.05 −.07
10. CEO tenure
8.11 7.89 −.34 .32 −.28 −.40
11. Board size
9.28 2.36 .40 −.39 .44 .74
12. Duality
0.58 0.49 .16 −.17 .19 .26
13. Board independence
0.78 0.14 .22 −.19 .27 .44
14. Racial diversity
0.12 0.14 .30 −.32 .37 .49
15. Female representation 0.14 0.10 .44 −.42 .45 .60

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.00
−.29
−.62
−.56
.01
−.16
.27
.04
.11
.26
.19

1.00
.50
.41
.13
−.09
−.03
.07
−.13
−.07
−.07

1.00
.90
.00
−.06
−.18
−.10
−.02
−.19
−.11

1.00
−.01
.07
−.23
−.04
−.00
−.17
−.20

1.00
−.17
.02
−.03
−.16
.05
.02

1.00
−.42
.20
−.13
−.37
−.42

1.00
.20
.34
.44
.51

1.00
.04 1.00
.19 .22 1.00
.07 .43 .32

Note. Correlations larger in absolute value than .11 are significant at p < .05.

13

14

Table 3. GEEs Regressions of Female Representation on Competitive Actions (N = 358).

Constant
Firm size
Prior performance
Capital intensity
R&D intensity

Complexity
Model 1
−2.81***
(0.77)
0.24***
(0.06)
−0.87†
(0.52)
2.99**
(0.99)
−0.55
(0.45)

Model 2
−2.29***
(0.81)
0.21***
(0.06)
−0.95†
(0.49)
2.85**
(0.98)
−0.68
(0.43)

Model 3
−2.24***
(0.83)
0.21***
(0.06)
−0.88†
(0.50)
3.03**
(1.03)
−0.67
(0.43)

Heterogeneity
Model 4
0.16
(0.57)
-0.20**
(0.08)
.10*
(0.43)
−2.01*
(0.95)
0.83**
(0.27)

Model 5
−0.52
(0.64)
−0.17*
(0.07)
11.21**
(0.45)
−2.00*
(0.96)
1.02***
(0.26)

Model 6
−0.51
(0.66)
−0.17*
(0.08)
1.21**
(0.45)
−2.01*
(0.95)
1.02***
(0.27)

Volume
Model 7
−0.75***
(0.16)
0.05***
(0.01)
−0.11
(0.11)
0.59**
(0.20)
−0.10
(0.09)

Model 8
−0.65***
(0.16)
0.04***
(0.01)
−0.15
(0.10)
0.54**
(0.18)
−0.11
(0.08)

Model 9
−0.64***
(0.16)
0.04***
(0.01)
−0.13
(0.10)
0.61***
(0.17)
−0.11
(0.08)

Slack
CEO gender
CEO tenure
Board size
Duality
Board independence
Racial diversity
Female representation
Female Representation
× CEO Gender

0.42
(0.34)
0.09
(0.23)
−0.02*
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.02)
0.11
(0.14)
0.13
(0.76)
−0.16
(0.58)

0.54†
(0.33)
0.08
(0.19)
−0.02*
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.02)
0.09
(0.14)
−0.18
(0.75)
−0.12
(0.52)
0.24*
(0.09)

0.53
(0.33)
−0.10
(0.21)
−0.02*
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.02)
0.12
(0.14)
−0.20
(0.75)
−0.09
(0.52)
0.23*
(0.09)
0.30*

−0.57**
(0.18)
0.26*
(0.12)
0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.04)
−0.12
(0.14)
−0.54
(0.45)
0.11
(0.88)

−0.75***
(0.19)
0.22*
(0.09)
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.04)
−0.11
(0.15)
−0.24
(0.43)
−0.25
(0.78)
−0.24*
(0.10)

(0.15)
Wald χ2
752***
3,233*** 1,556*** 677***
3,113***
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. GEE = generalized estimation equation.
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (two-sided tests).

−0.75***
(0.20)
0.22*
(0.10)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.04)
−0.10
(0.15)
−0.25
(0.45)
−0.25
(0.78)
−0.24*
(0.11)
0.04

0.08
(0.06)
−0.01
(0.05)
−0.00†
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.02)
0.05
(0.15)
0.03
(0.09)

0.09
(0.06)
−0.02
(0.04)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.02)
0.00
(0.15)
0.05
(0.09)
0.04**
(0.01)

0.09
(0.06)
−0.10*
(0.04)
−0.00†
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.02)
−0.00
(0.15)
0.06
(0.09)
0.04**
(0.01)
0.09***

(0.16)
(0.02)
4,301*** 2,098*** 2,344*** 31,650***

Models 1, 4, and 7 are the base models including only the control variables. Hypotheses 1a and 1b
were related to the influence of female board representation on competitive complexity. Model 2
shows that we found support for Hypothesis 1a where more female directors lead to greater
competitive complexity (p < .05). In terms of practical significance, we estimated that for two
otherwise identical boards, the competitive complexity for a board with female directors at 1SD above
the mean is about 74% higher compared to a board with 0 female directors. In Hypotheses 2a and 2b,
we examined how female board representation affects competitive heterogeneity. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2b, the coefficient of female board representation is negative and significant (p < .05; see
Model 5). Examining the practical significance of those results, we found that all else being equal
moving from a board with no female directors to a board with female directors at 1SD above the mean
resulted in about 43% reduction in competitive heterogeneity. In Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we theorized
about the relationship between female board representation and competitive volume. We found
support for Hypothesis 3a as the coefficient of female board representation in Model 8 is positive and
significant (p < .01). Regarding the practical significance of this finding, we estimated that for two
otherwise identical boards, the competitive volume for a board with female directors at 1SD above the
mean is about 52% higher compared to a board with 0 female directors. In support of Hypothesis 4, the
interaction coefficient of female board representation and CEO gender was positive and significant (p <
.05; see Model 3). Stated differently, a female CEO strengthened the positive relationship between
female board representation and competitive complexity. Hypothesis 5 proposed a moderation effect
of a female CEO on the relationship between female board representation and competitive
heterogeneity. We did not find support for this hypothesis. Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 6, a
female CEO interacted with female directors to increase the volume of competitive actions conducted
by the firm (the interaction coefficient of female board representation and CEO gender is positive and
significant in Model 9, p < .001). Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical representations of the interactions.

Figure 1. Interaction of female representation and CEO gender on complexity.

Figure 2. Interaction of female representation and CEO gender on volume.

Discussion

Faced with increasing pressure for greater female representation in the boardroom, many firms are
struggling to determine how adding female directors affects the strategic direction of the firm.
Combining research on female board representation with research on CD enables us to contribute to
both streams of research. In terms of competitive dynamic research, we address calls to examine the
role of board gender composition on competitive actions (Hughes-Morgan et al., 2018). By utilizing the
AMC model, we show that female directors play a key role in shaping the competitive repertoire of the
firm. Specifically, the presence of female board members leads to the initiation of more complex
competitive actions, less heterogeneous competitive actions, and a greater volume of competitive
actions. With respect to competitive complexity and competitive volume, female directors may draw
on different cognitive frames, experiences, and social ties to enhance both the board’s awareness of
the necessity to pursue more complex actions and greater volume of actions, and the board’s
capability to implement such competitive action. This increased awareness and capability appear to
outweigh some of the other aspects of having a female presence in the boardroom, such as reduced
cohesiveness and more conflict, which hinder the board’s motivation for action. With respect to
competitive heterogeneity, it appears that by engaging in more deliberate monitoring and greater risk
aversion, female directors affect the whole board to pursue competitive actions that adhere closely to
the industry status quo (i.e., actions that are less heterogeneous).
In addition to extending CD research, this study also contributes to research that investigates whether
adding female directors to corporate boards shape firms’ strategic involvement (Post & Byron, 2015).
Our empirical results provide further understanding to two questions: Do female board members have
an effect on the firm’s competitive repertoire? Under what conditions is this effect more or less
pronounced? With respect to the first question, our results clearly demonstrate that female directors
play a key role in shaping the competitive posture of the firm and the variety of competitive actions
necessary to compete with rivals. Moreover, by identifying some of the specific activities that female
board members impact, we extend prior research discussing female directors’ involvement with firm
strategy (Chen et al., 2016; Miller & Triana, 2009; Post & Byron, 2015; Triana et al., 2013). This allows
us to move away from the rather distant link between women and performance and instead “get
closer to the action” (Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008) by studying a more proximal
issue—how women on corporate boards influence competitive actions.

In terms of the second question, empirical results suggest that female board members may exert
greater influence on competitive actions when the firm is run by a female CEO. Specifically, our
moderation analyses indicate that firms combining female directors with a female CEO engage in more
complex competitive actions and a greater volume of competitive actions. Our findings build on
previous findings (Hoobler et al., 2016) that suggest having a female CEO may enable female board
members to exercise their unique talents and play an active role in strategy ratification. We speculate
that having a female CEO helps overcome some of the barriers that female directors face, such as
being considered a token and excluded from decision-making processes (Cook & Glass, 2014). This is in
line with prior research arguing for developing a climate of inclusion and tolerance (Chatman et al.,
1998; Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002) toward minorities in the upper ranks of the firm to encourage
effective team functioning.

Limitations

Our study is not without limitations. Although, we show that women on corporate boards drive a firm’s
pattern of competitive actions that are essential in capturing a competitive advantage in the
marketplace, we did not examine how female directors’ impact on competitive actions affects the
firm’s financial performance. This is an important next step to substantiate the business case for
women. Future research should test whether and how the market reacts to the announcement of
competitive actions driven by corporate boards with female members. Second, we did not measure or
observe board processes. Instead, we inferred board interactions and dynamics that affect competitive
actions. We encourage future research to draw on surveys, interviews, and other primary data options
(Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010) to capture the specific mechanism and dynamics in the
boardroom.
Third, our sample consists of firms in a single industry. We chose this approach for two primary
reasons: (a) the greater level of female representation in the pharmaceutical industry ensures enough
variability in our sample (Catalyst, 2015), and (b) there is readily available information about the types
of competitive actions that pharmaceutical companies undertake to boost future valuations (Cardinal,
2001). While the relationship between female board representation and competitive actions could vary
across industries, we believe that female directors could be an important driver of competitive actions
in industries outside of the pharmaceutical domain. For example, prior research provides evidence that
female directors have a strong influence on various strategic activities across diverse industries (Chen
et al., 2016; Miller & Triana, 2009; Triana et al., 2013).
Finally, we focused on various characteristics of competitive actions, such as complexity,
heterogeneity, and volume, to capture the strategic outcomes of female presence in the boardroom.
Yet, much research in CD has examined the timing of competitive actions and reactions. We did not
account for the speed or timing of actions but studying the impact of female directors on those
outcomes could be a fruitful avenue of future research.

Practical Implications

By demonstrating the role of women in both board and CEO positions on strategic decision making, we
provide evidence of the importance inherent in the dynamics of gender-diverse boards with the female
leadership at the top level. With respect to the market for managerial talent, boards of directors and

CEOs are the critical drivers of a firm’s strategy. Selecting not just the best talent, but the best
combination of talent is crucial to firm outcomes. This argument stems from the insight that female
board members combined with a female CEO may be better equipped to develop beneficial strategic
repertoires (Hughes-Morgan et al., 2010).
It is also important to acknowledge that female directors play a differentiated role in terms of various
competitive actions. This suggests that the board’s gender composition is an important precursor to
the firm’s competitive repertoire. Thus, by making structural changes to board composition, firms may
alter their competitive behavior and the pattern of industry rivalry. As competitive actions are the
mechanism that firms use to outmaneuver competitors to gain a superior competitive position
(D’Aveni, 1994; Ferrier, 2001; Smith et al., 2001), there is a strong motivation to understand how
adding female board members affects board dynamics and decisions concerning competitive actions.
We hope that our study provokes more scholarly interest in how firm-level strategic behaviors are
influenced by the increasingly diverse world in which we live. We have demonstrated that gender
affects the motivation and capability of corporate boards to carry out varying repertoires of
competitive actions. By the same token, political affiliation or country of origin may also impact the
awareness, motivation, and capability of upper management to engage in aggressive competition, as
these views may either enhance or hinder cooperative tendencies. After all, corporations are run by
individuals and their mind-sets may have a significant influence on how firm resources are used (Lyles
& Schwenk, 1992). Toward this end, we think that management scholars are well positioned to
contribute, given our field’s focus on the firm-environment interface. Indeed, the distinctive role of
management research among the social sciences has always been its capacity to integrate behavioral
and motivational theories with our own understanding of firms to provide insights and guidance to
individuals who oversee them.
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Notes

1. Although our chosen industry has a greater female representation, we acknowledge the “small
numbers” limitation that is inherent in most studies that examine women in upper echelons.
2. In five of the firms in the data, there was at least one year with a female CEO.
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